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INTRODUCTION
As statutory schemes go, the patent statute has been relatively stable from 1952 to the present. In contrast to copyright law, where
Congress has taken a close—indeed at times intense—interest in the
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1

details of the statutory scheme, legislative intervention into the patent
statute, when it has occurred, has been more limited and narrower in
2
scope. For many reasons, however, patent law has been disequilibrating over time, and calls for patent reform have been increasing in intensity. One of the many factors contributing to this disequilibration
in recent years has been the ongoing emergence of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) as a more robust institutional player actively seeking to influence patent policy. The more prominent role
played by the PTO is both a cause and an effect of dissatisfaction with
the state of patent law.
In order to better understand some of the forces behind the
moves toward patent reform, we should examine not just who is demanding legal change, but which institutions are able and willing to
supply legal rules and norms. Since 1952, Congress has left much of
the market for supply-side influence in patent law to the federal courts
and, to a lesser degree, to the PTO. In 1982, Congress consolidated
appellate jurisdiction over patent cases in one court, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Since then, lacking institutional
competition from other courts, the Federal Circuit has strengthened
patent law. In the process, the court has made this a more attractive
area for institutions to wield legal and policy influence.
This development has not been lost on the PTO. For a while now,
the PTO has been vying to gain more influence in the market for supplying legal rules and norms. The PTO is on both the demand side
and the supply side in patent law evolution, functioning as a de3
mander of some changes to patent policy and as a supplier of others.
In the process, it has appealed to the inventive community for support.
In this Article, I examine some of the ways in which the PTO has
maneuvered since the early 1990s to occupy a more central position in

1

See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, secs. 103, 202,
112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76, 2877-86 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512,
1201–1205 (2006)) (creating safe harbors for service providers and prescribing civil
and criminal remedies for the circumvention of copyright protection systems); Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (extending the term of copyright
protection).
2
See, e.g., Patent and Trademark Office Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501A-572 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (reorganizing the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
3
For example, the PTO is a demander of change in the form of more deference
to its decisions and a (potential) supplier of change through revision and reformation
of its examiner productivity metric.
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making patent law and policy. I tell a slightly different story from the
one often told, in which regulatory agencies are passive targets of attempts at capture by their constituencies. Whereas the literature on
the origin of attempts to influence the regulatory process focuses
4
mostly on the demand side, in this Article I focus on the supply side.
One of the weaknesses of the capture theory as it is often presented is
that it assumes that only the regulated constituency takes the initiative.
This implies that interest groups are the instigators of attempts at
regulatory entanglement, an assumption that is questionable in the
case of the PTO. I argue that while we often think of agency entanglement with the community it is supposed to regulate as an unalloyed
bad, there have been some positive results from the PTO’s attempts to
increase its influence. Whether this state of affairs will continue, however, remains to be seen.
In Part I of this Article, I argue that the supply side of patent law
has long been dominated if not monopolized by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. With patent law having increased in importance in the past few decades, the PTO, facing few competitors in the
patent policymaking field, has had an incentive to emerge as a
stronger player in the market for legal influence over patent law by
increasing its own influence. In Part II, I describe two major types of
moves in which the PTO has engaged, and continues to engage, in
order to accomplish this. One set of moves has given the PTO slightly
more legal power. The results are more important for their symbolic
value than for influencing legal outcomes. The other maneuver by
the PTO is more subtle but more substantively important: appeals for
support by the PTO to the constituency—inventors—with which it is
supposed to have an adversarial relationship. (I do not maintain,
however, that the PTO has been captured by the inventive community.) The resulting benefits to the PTO—such as a larger budget,
new facilities, and more control over its finances—have been measurable. In Part III of this Article, I argue that so far, the PTO’s attempts
to increase its influence have had some social benefits. PTO attempts
to appeal to the inventive community have resulted in greater institutional transparency and more rigorous debate about the faults and
flaws of the patent system. At the same time, expanding the PTO’s

4

See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making:
A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089, 1090 (1991) (criticizing earlier studies of regulatory decision making for failing to consider the relationships between
members of the supply and demand sides).
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power presents dangers. In the long run, it is unclear whether the
benefits will outweigh the costs.
There are a few caveats: First, let me emphasize once again that
I’m not saying the PTO has been captured. Certainly the PTO has in
recent years displayed a sensitivity to the views of the inventive community that it previously lacked, and it has attempted to enlist the inventive community in its efforts to expand its influence and budget,
but this is not the same as saying that the PTO has become controlled
5
by the inventive community. Second, I’m being deliberately reductionist in this Article. I’m not trying to set out all the subtleties of the
complex institution that is the PTO. Rather, I’m seeking to capture
some essential features of the PTO’s relative positioning throughout
the past two decades, and to distill some key moves that the PTO has
made in order to illustrate how it has maneuvered itself. Doing that
means I’m deliberately excluding other forces that have shaped the
fortunes of the PTO. In addition, throughout this Article my intent is
not to take a normative position on the legal or budgetary issues on
which the PTO has taken an advocacy position. Rather, it is to argue
that each of these events has resulted in the PTO having more influence and more wherewithal to increase its influence.
I. PATENT LAW’S SUPPLY SIDE
Courts are the primary locus of the evolution of patent law. Since
1952, Congress has not taken much interest in amending the patent
code, leaving the bulk of legal evolution to the courts. Starting in
1982, that meant delegating the evolution of patent law to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Congress’s lack of interest
has been longstanding; it was relatively indifferent even before the
creation of the Federal Circuit. On the few occasions that significant
amendments to the patent statute have been successful, they have often pertained to procedural or administrative matters—such as better
6
funding for the PTO—on which all participants agree.

5

Nor is the PTO truly a regulatory agency in the sense that, for instance, the Food
and Drug Administration is a regulatory agency. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 129-30 (2000) (arguing
that the PTO’s relationship is more contractual than regulatory).
6
See, e.g., American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-113,
sec. 4502, § 122(b)(1), 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-561 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 122(b)(1) (2006)) (authorizing public disclosure of certain patent applications).
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Why hasn’t Congress taken a closer interest in patent law? The
broad standards that comprise most of the patent code indicate that
Congress has delegated patent policy to the courts, particularly to the
Federal Circuit, but whether this is a cause or an effect of Congress’s
indifference—or indeed if there is any causal link—remains unclear.
Given that Congress outsourced the writing of the 1952 Patent Act
7
and passed it without floor debate, it’s not clear that any legislative
8
intent can be attributed to members of Congress regarding the Act.
Recent criticism of the Federal Circuit (much of it vituperative) coming from the patent community may tempt us to forget that wide9
spread dissatisfaction with the court is a new phenomenon. From the
time of its creation until relatively recently, commentators generally
believed the Federal Circuit was doing a good job in its various subject
10
areas. Congress may have felt no great need to intervene in an area
it perceived as complex and technical. Probably all of these reasons
play a part to varying degrees in explaining Congress’s reticence to
pass new patent legislation.
If Congress hasn’t been an institution active in patent law, then
who has? Not the Supreme Court. It doesn’t enter the lists often
enough, even in recent years, to have a wide impact on the field.
11
Since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit has been the main locus of patent law evolution. When it was created, the Federal Circuit
was tasked with bringing consistency to patent law. Many commenta7

As Judge Giles S. Rich, one of the authors of the 1952 Patent Act, explained,
“The New Patent Act went through both houses on consent calendars, and those
houses relied on the unanimous recommendations of their respective committees.”
Neil A. Smith, Remembrances and Memorial: Judge Giles Sutherland Rich 1904–1999, 82 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 597, 601 (2000).
8
Giles S. Rich and P.J. Federico were the two main drafters of the 1952 Patent Act.
Judge Rich asserted that “[l]egislative intent was supplied later . . . in the form of the
Reviser’s Notes.” Id.; see also P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A.
1, 6-9 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 166-70 (1993)
(reviewing the evolution of the bill and the lack of significant congressional scrutiny).
9
See, e.g., Charles W. Shifley et al., Is Federal Circuit Obviousness Law “Gobbledygook”
and “Irrational”? Why Justice Scalia Says So, and What May Come of That, INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J., May 2007, at 5, 7-8 (stating that “the Federal Circuit is arguably at an alltime low in terms of reputation among all judges, professors, and commentators since
its creation in 1982”).
10
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 74 (1989) (“On the whole, the CAFC experiment has
worked well for patent law . . . .”).
11
See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, secs. 101–102,
96 Stat. 25, 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44 (2006)) (establishing a Federal Court of
Appeals and a Federal Claims Court). The jurisdiction of the court is set out in 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a).
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tors would argue that it has accomplished this task well, although most
would also say that it has become a pro-patent court (although that
depends to some degree on one’s baseline). Adam Jaffe and Josh
Lerner, for instance, show that the Federal Circuit has been more
likely to find patents valid and infringed than did the appellate courts
12
before 1982. While this does demonstrate that expectation baselines
about the enforceability of patents have changed, without more, it
doesn’t prove that the Federal Circuit has been captured. For one
thing, we need to know whether the validity determinations made by
appellate courts before the Federal Circuit were accurate. Perhaps
courts were previously too quick to invalidate patents.
Two stories could be told about the Federal Circuit making patents more enforceable. One is a public interest story. On this view,
patent enforcement had become too weak, and declaring more patents valid increased social welfare. It has long been known that patent
cases are unpopular with many members of the judiciary. Prior to the
creation of the Federal Circuit, the fastest way a district court judge
could make a patent case go away for good was to declare the patent
invalid. By midcentury, antipatent sentiment ran so high that Justice
Jackson famously lamented that the Supreme Court had developed
such a “strong passion” for striking down patents that the only valid
patents left were ones the “Court ha[d] not been able to get its hands
13
on.” And as Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner note of Sakraida v. AG Pro,
14
Inc., one of the few patent cases in the latter half of the twentieth
century in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
Who would get the duty of writing the opinion for this “cow shit case”
was a matter of considerable controversy—ultimately, it was assigned to
Justice William Brennan because he had antagonized the Chief Justice
with his acrid dissents in other cases. Perhaps not surprisingly, the decision that resulted in this case was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with
15
the Supreme Court’s own earlier rulings.

Even today, patent cases are generally unpopular with district
court judges, many of whom continue to express dislike of patents and

12

See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT 98-107 (2004) (noting trends in the Federal Circuit toward strengthening patent holders’ rights).
13
Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
14
425 U.S. 273 (1976). In this case the Court found the patent obvious and therefore invalid. Id. at 282-83.
15
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 12, at 100 (footnote omitted).
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16

dismay about having patent cases on their dockets. As some commentators have noted, before the Federal Circuit was created it was
17
difficult to imagine how patents could have become much weaker.
On this view, hostility to patents among the judiciary was so great that
the Federal Circuit’s strengthening of patent law was a necessary and
18
efficiency-enhancing corrective measure.
But of course a pessimistic story could be told as well: that of judicial self-aggrandizement. Judges in specialized courts may come to
identify a little too closely with the areas of law in which they special19
ize. Enforcement of patents increases the importance and impact of
patent law, and we can expect judges to prefer that their cases be perceived as important rather than mundane or marginal. On this view,
the Federal Circuit has focused on benefiting patent interests even
though the costs more broadly imposed on society may outweigh
those benefits. Both the public interest story and the self-interest story
have explanatory power when applied to the Federal Circuit; neither
is mutually exclusive.
In either case, by making patents stronger and making patent law
more economically important, the Federal Circuit has expanded the
market for supply-side institutions in patent law, thus creating incentives for the PTO to try to gain some market share. Although the
Federal Circuit has been the major force affecting the shape of patent
law, over the past decade it has started to receive some competition.
So far, this competition has come neither from Congress nor in a serious way from the Supreme Court, even though the Supreme Court
recently has been granting certiorari on more patent cases than in
20
previous years. Rather, the competition has come from an executive
16

See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing Proceedings at 19, O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., No.
95-0113 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1995) (quoting Judge Kent saying of patent cases, “You
know, it’s hard to deal with [these] things”).
17
See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 12, at 97 (“[T]he ‘pro-patent’ policy
changes of the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as the inevitable, perhaps even desirable,
historical ‘backswing’ after a long period of weakening patents.”).
18
I do not take a position on what the optimal level of patent protection is, but I
do agree with most scholars and industry analysts that patent protection was badly fractured prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit. See Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 74
(stating that patent law is more uniform and better suited for national interests today).
19
See generally Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until
1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
761 (1983) (arguing that the caseload crisis in the federal courts of appeals has led to
delegation and specialization of courts and interests).
20
See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008); KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746
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branch institution, the PTO. Since approximately 1993, the PTO has
been maneuvering to become more powerful.
The PTO has maneuvered not only to bolster its reputation and
material position, but also to increase its power in the world of patent
law and policy. Initially the PTO focused on international patent law,
where it had little competition from other state institutions, but then
it began to seek power closer to home and sought to increase its
power relative to the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Dickinson v. Zurko, which brought the PTO’s factual findings under
the ambit of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), was a step in
this direction and a significant symbolic victory in the eyes of the
21
PTO. Since then, the PTO has boasted of its role in advising the Solicitor General’s Office as to whether the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari on patent cases coming out of the Federal Circuit, announcing when the Supreme Court’s decision to grant or deny certiorari
matches up with the advice that the PTO has given the Solicitor Gen22
eral’s Office.
II. THE PTO’S ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE
What elements have contributed to the PTO’s relative positioning? In this Part, I discuss a few moves the PTO has made that have
influenced its relative institutional positioning. These moves fall into
two categories: first, attempts to gain more legal power, both over its
own internal matters and in administrative appeals of patent matters
before the Federal Circuit; and second, petitions to the inventive
community and Congress for a larger budget and other resources,
more control over its finances, and a new physical plant. When successful, these moves have increased the PTO’s power and allowed it to
gain a larger market share, if you will, of patent law and policy decision making. I focus only on moves that are endogenous to the PTO.
Other factors, such as the importance of technological innovation and

(2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). But see Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite
Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted).
21
527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999). The petitioner was Q. Todd Dickinson, the PTO Director at the time.
22
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 50 [hereinafter 2007 REPORT]; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 47-48; U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 48-49 [hereinafter 2005 REPORT].
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the strength of the economy, have no doubt contributed in some way
to the relative position of the PTO in recent years, but these issues are
beyond the scope of this Article.
Notably, the PTO’s desire to increase its legal influence and to
appeal to the inventive community has been confined to the patent
side of the agency. As the PTO itself has said, “The Patent Business is
one of the PTO’s three core businesses. The primary mission of the
23
Patent Business is to help customers get patents.” By contrast, the
trademark side of the PTO is less ambitious: “The primary mission of
the Trademark Business is to apply the provisions of the Trademark
Act of 1946 in the examination and registration of trademarks. . . .
The core process of the Trademark Business is the examination of an
24
application for trademark registration.” Although in recent years the
PTO has become more subtle in its language, the description of the
business of the patent side of the PTO as “help[ing] customers get
patents” is clearly an appeal to the group with which the PTO is supposed to have an adversarial relationship.
A. Legal Influence
The PTO has made several attempts to increase its influence over
patent law in the past decade. The first of these occurred in 1999 with
the passage of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), which
reorganized the PTO and established it as an executive branch agency
25
instead of just a subunit of the Department of Commerce. The second attempt concluded that same year in Dickinson v. Zurko, in which
the PTO won the right to have APA standards of review applied to its
factual conclusions when patent applicants appeal directly to the Fed26
eral Circuit. The third is an ongoing battle, and the logical outgrowth of Zurko: determining the proper scope of the PTO’s rule27
making authority. I take no position in this Article on the merits of
any of these moves on the part of the PTO. Instead, I merely point

23

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, CORPORATE PLAN—2001, at 23, http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/corpplan/index.htm.
24
Id. at 42.
25
See AIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-113, secs. 4711–4712, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-572
to -575 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006)).
26
Zurko, 527 U.S. at 154-55.
27
See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the PTO does not
have substantive rulemaking authority, finding that the PTO-proposed rules at issue in
the case were procedural, and remanding to the district court for further proceedings).
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out that all of these moves have increased, at least to some degree, the
PTO’s power as a supplier of legal rules and patent policies.
1. The AIPA and Executive Branch Agency Status
The Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform
Act of 1999, of which the AIPA was a part, expanded the top ranks of
28
the PTO and gave the entity more control over its operations. It reorganized the way the PTO was structured and made it an executive
29
branch agency within the Department of Commerce. The AIPA elevated the position of head of the PTO from Commissioner to Director
(also an Under Secretary of Commerce), who is required to have “a
professional background and experience in patent or trademark
30
law.” The AIPA also expanded the top ranks of the PTO to include
two commissioners appointed by the Director—a Commissioner of
Patents and a Commissioner of Trademarks—and, upon nomination
31
by the Director, a Deputy Director. The PTO reports to the Secretary of Commerce for policy direction, but the PTO’s executive
branch agency status gives it control over its budget allocations and
other administrative management functions. The AIPA also created
the Patent Public Advisory Committee and the Trademark Public Advisory Committee to advise the Director on PTO policies, goals, per32
formance, budget matters, and user fees.
These changes noticeably benefited the PTO. Restructuring the
PTO as an executive branch agency was the first step toward giving the
PTO more power and self-governance. It was also an important step
toward giving the PTO control over its budget, and budget control is a
source of power for bureaucrats. The existence of the Advisory Committees at least allowed the PTO to create the appearance that it was
willing to accept feedback and input from the regulated community,
while ensuring that the PTO wasn’t legally bound by the committees’
recommendations. At the time, the inventive community supported
these changes before Congress. As the American Intellectual Property
Law Association (AIPLA), a bar association representing intellectual
28

See AIPA secs. 4711–4713, 113 Stat. at 1501A-572 to -578.
Id. sec. 4711. Prior to the passage of the AIPA, the head of the PTO was a Commissioner appointed by the President. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1994).
30
AIPA sec. 4713, § 3(a)(1), 113 Stat. at 1501A-575 to -578 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1) (2006)).
31
Id. sec. 4713, § 3(b)(1)–(2), 113 Stat. at 1501A-576 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 3(b)(1)–(2)).
32
Id. sec. 4714, 113 Stat. at 1501A-578 to -580 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 5).
29
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property lawyers, asserted, “[T]he PTO could function more efficiently and effectively, and provide users with higher-quality and more
responsive products and services if it were properly transformed into a
33
government corporation.” Since then, however, some commentators
in the inventive community have become more critical of the results.
For example, some commentators have argued that the Patent Public
Advisory Committee is toothless and “has never effectively asserted any
real oversight of PTO operations,” or is even being undermined by
the PTO itself because it has been “provided with no real support to
34
investigate and challenge.”
2. Judicial Deference
In addition to getting more autonomy from executive branch
oversight, the PTO has also been trying to get more deferential review
of its decisions from the Federal Circuit. The more deferential the review, the broader the range of PTO action that would survive a legal
challenge. Historically, the PTO’s decisions did not receive much
35
deference before a reviewing court. For decades, reviewing courts
36
applied neither the deferential standards of review of the APA nor
37
those of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. to
the PTO, choosing instead to apply older and more rigorous stan38
dards of review.
33

Patent Law Changes: Hearing on H.R. 400 and H.R. 811 Before the H. Subcomm. on
Gov’t Programs and Oversight of the Comm. of Small Bus., 105th Cong. 167 (1997) (statement
of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association).
34
Posting of Greg Aharonian to Patent Law Blog (Patently-O), Patent Public Advisory Committee (PPAC), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/08/patent-public-a.html
(Aug. 17, 2007).
35
The PTO has long had regulatory authority to enact rules that govern its internal proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A).
36
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (mandating that courts reviewing agency action set
aside such actions if they are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or . . . unsupported by substantial evidence”).
37
See 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (stating that courts must defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute so long as the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable”).
38
The Federal Circuit has often rejected the application of APA standards to review of PTO findings of fact. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (applying the “clearly erroneous” standard of review), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (refusing to modify the “clearly erroneous” standard of review); In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610,
614 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (using a more stringent standard of review than that of the APA);
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (refusing to address the issue of
standard of review because it was not perceived as central to the case). The Federal Circuit has also declined to apply Chevron to the PTO’s interpretations of law. See Merck &
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This was no great surprise, even if some commentators considered
it a bit of a puzzle that reviewing courts declined to apply APA stan39
dards of review to the PTO. Early drafts of the APA explicitly ex40
empted the PTO from the APA’s purview. From the passage of the
APA until the end of the twentieth century, as the Supreme Court
noted, “both the patent bench and the patent bar had concluded that
the stricter ‘clearly erroneous’ standard was . . . a requirement placed
upon the PTO,” and “even the PTO acquiesced in this interpretation
41
for almost 50 years after the enactment of the APA.”
By getting a more deferential standard of review applied to its factual and legal findings, however, the PTO would have a better chance
of making its decisions stick. In Dickinson v. Zurko, the PTO saw a
chance to raise the level of deference that it received from the Federal
42
Circuit from the traditional “clearly erroneous” standard of review to
the APA’s marginally more deferential “substantial evidence” or “arbi43
trary and capricious” standard.
Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reviewing de novo the determination
of law); Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 398 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that “we need not defer to any reasonable interpretation of the Commissioner”).
39
See, e.g., Wm. Redin Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem
of Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 950, 950 (1942) (noting that the courts have
failed to treat patents as matters of administrative law).
40
See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1451 (discussing the original exclusion of patent matters from the scope of the APA); see also George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 161819 tbl.1 (1996) (discussing the history of the passage of the APA and listing the PTO as
an agency exempted under the Walter-Logan Bill).
41
Zurko, 527 U.S. at 171 & n.* (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
42
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948) (“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”).
43
These standards are drawn from 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006), which codifies section 10(e) of the APA. It states in relevant part the following:
The reviewing court shall—
....
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
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In Zurko, a disappointed patent applicant appealed the PTO’s denial of her patent application to the Federal Circuit, challenging the
44
PTO’s understanding of the prior art as clearly erroneous. The Federal Circuit agreed, reversing the PTO’s decision and applying the
traditional “clearly erroneous” standard of review to the PTO’s factual
45
The PTO petitioned for a rehearing en banc on the
findings.
ground that the Federal Circuit should have applied an APA-level
standard of deference, which the PTO maintained would have caused
the Federal Circuit to affirm the PTO’s decision. Noting that “[t]he
[PTO] Commissioner has campaigned aggressively” for the PTO to be
granted greater deference, upon rehearing the Federal Circuit
unanimously held that the APA’s standards of review did not apply
when the Federal Circuit reviews the PTO’s findings of fact in direct
46
appeals from the PTO.
In a somewhat fractured reversal of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the APA applied to the court’s review of PTO
47
findings of fact. The Court came out against anti–PTO exceptionalism, requiring that PTO decisions be treated the same as other agency
rulings and stressing “the importance of maintaining a uniform ap48
proach to judicial review of administrative action.” The Court left
open the question of precisely which APA standard to apply, however,
49
confining itself to the question of whether the APA applied at all.
Subsequent to Zurko, the Federal Circuit has chosen the “substantial
50
evidence” standard. If one is of a cynical cast of mind, this result

(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to [either the
rulemaking or adjudication provisions of the APA] or otherwise reviewed
on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial
de novo by the reviewing court.
Id.
44

In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1997), rev’d en banc, 142 F.3d 1447
(Fed. Cir. 1998), rev’d sub nom. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
45
Id. at 889.
46
In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1449.
47
Zurko, 527 U.S. at 152.
48
Id. at 154; see also id. at 165 (stating that the Federal Circuit and supporting
amici failed to explain “convincingly why direct review of the PTO’s patent denials
demands a stricter fact-related review standard than is applicable to other agencies”).
49
Id. at 158.
50
See, e.g., In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (concluding that
“‘substantial evidence’ review applies when the reviewing court must confine its review
of agency factfinding to the record produced by the agency proceeding”).
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should not be surprising. The “substantial evidence” standard is generally considered slightly less deferential than arbitrary and capricious
review, primarily because substantial evidence review applies to formal
agency proceedings and requires the agency to put its reasoning in
51
the record. The Federal Circuit perhaps saw the case as a zero-sum
game between itself and the PTO. This would not be unusual; appellate courts are sensitive to the boundaries of power between courts
and agencies and, given the choice, are loath to concede ground to
52
the latter.
Orin Kerr has called Zurko’s pondering of the level of deference to
give to the PTO’s factual findings “a question with more symbolic than
practical importance,” the results of which are not “likely to have a
53
significant impact on the functioning of the patent system.” While it
is true that the number of cases affected by the difference is small—as
the Supreme Court in Zurko itself noted, the functional difference between an “unsupported by substantial evidence” standard and a
54
“clearly erroneous” standard is vanishingly small —the symbolic importance of Zurko looms large. Zurko taught the PTO and the Federal
Circuit alike that the PTO could take on the Federal Circuit and win.
The PTO’s en banc request to the Federal Circuit, its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and its resulting victory heralded the
first of several changes of fortune for the PTO. Zurko morphed from a
run-of-the-mill appeal of a patent denial by the PTO into the first major PTO win in the legal battle to increase its influence vis-à-vis the
Federal Circuit. Indeed, in its opinion, the Supreme Court perhaps
unwittingly picked up on this dynamic, addressing (and chiding) the

51

See Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7
(1983) (indicating that the “substantial evidence” standard is more rigorous than the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard). In writing the majority opinion in Zurko, however,
Justice Breyer indicated that the two standards were similar. See 527 U.S. at 158 (citing
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984), for the proposition that
there is “no difference between the APA’s ‘arbitrary, capricious’ standard and its ‘substantial evidence’ standard as applied to court review of agency factfinding”).
52
See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1027 & n.114 (discussing appellate courts’ resistance to applying deferential review standards to agency decisions).
53
Kerr, supra note 5, at 168.
54
See 527 U.S. at 162-63 (noting that the difference between the “clearly erroneous” standard and the “unsupported by substantial evidence” standard is “so fine that
(apart from the present case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a
reviewing court conceded that use of one standard rather than the other would in fact
have produced a different outcome”).
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Federal Circuit as if the court and its supporters, rather than Mary
55
Zurko, were parties to the case.
3. The Scope of Rulemaking Authority
After the PTO received heightened deference in Zurko for its factual findings, the next logical step for it was to seek to solidify and expand the scope of its rulemaking authority. First the PTO presented
its case before Congress. In 2007, the PTO thanked Congress for
56
proposing legislation, the Patent Reform Act of 2007, that would
grant it the power “to promulgate such rules, regulations and orders
that the Director determines appropriate to carry out the provisions of
Title 35 or any other applicable law,” arguing that it “has long be57
lieved that rulemaking authority is beneficial to the patent system.”
Despite passing the House of Representatives, the proposed legislation ultimately failed to be enacted, but the PTO has not given up.
The latest incarnation of the debate over the proper scope of PTO
rulemaking power involves the question of when patent rules are substantive and when they are procedural. The PTO has regulatory authority to enact rules governing “the conduct of [its internal] pro58
ceedings,” but the line between establishing procedural rules and
engaging in substantive legal determinations is not always clear. In
August 2007, after a notice and comment period, the PTO announced
59
a set of final rules that it claimed would help streamline the patent
approval process and improve its ability to examine patent applica60
tions. Among other things, the rules limited the ability of a patent
55

See, e.g., id. at 154 (“The Federal Circuit rests its claim for an exception upon
§ 559.”); id. at 164 (“Second, the [Federal] Circuit and its supporting amici believe that
a change to APA review standards will create an anomaly.”); id. at 165 (“Finally, the
[Federal] Circuit reasons that its stricter court/court review will produce better agency
factfinding.”).
56
See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
57
See Letter from John J. Sullivan, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to the
Honorable Howard L. Berman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Prop., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives 9 (May 16,
2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sullivan Letter] (presenting the views of the
Department of Commerce and the PTO on H.R. 1908, the proposed Patent Reform
Act of 2007).
58
35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006).
59
Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1 (2008)).
60
See id. at 46,716 (explaining that the “changes will mean more effective and efficient examination for the typical applicant”).
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applicant to file continuation or continuation-in-part applications,
limited the number of claims that could be included in a patent appli62
cation, and increased the burdens on applicants to disclose informa63
64
tion about the invention. Both sets of rules were to be retroactive.
The proposed rules were challenged by parties claiming that the rules
65
were “unlawful agency action under subsection 706(2) of the APA”
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
66
which found that the new rules exceeded the PTO’s rulemaking authority.
Upon appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled in Tafas v. Doll that the
PTO had the authority to establish regulations that “govern the conduct of proceedings in the office,” that “facilitate and expedite the
processing of patent applications,” and that “govern the recognition
and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing appli67
cants or other parties” before it. Within these boundaries, the court
stated that it would grant Chevron deference to the PTO’s “interpretation of statutory provisions that relate to the exercise of delegated au68
thority.” The Federal Circuit, however, agreed with the district court
that the patent statute “does not vest the USPTO with any general

61

See 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(1)(i)–(iii) (permitting an applicant, as a matter of right,
to file two continuation or continuation-in-part applications, plus a single request for
continued examination (RCE), after an initial application); id. § 1.114(f) (stating the
conditions under which a petition is not necessary to request continued examination).
If the applicant wanted to continue engaging in prosecution of the application, the
applicant would have to petition to do so. See id. § 1.78(d)(1)(vi) (“A petition must be
filed in such nonprovisional application that is accompanied by the fee set forth in
§ 1.17(f) and a showing that the amendment, argument, or evidence sought to be entered could not have been submitted during the prosecution of the prior-filed application.”); id. § 1.114(g) (requiring that the petition show why the “amendment, argument, or evidence . . . could not have been submitted prior to the close of prosecution
in the application”).
62
See id. § 1.75(b)(1) (permitting an applicant to present a maximum of five independent claims or twenty-five total claims for examination unless additional information is filed).
63
See id. (requiring an applicant who wants to exceed the limitations to submit an
“examination support document”).
64
See Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,716-17 (breaking down the applicability dates by section).
65
Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (E.D. Va. 2008), vacated in part sub nom.
Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
66
Id. at 817.
67
559 F.3d at 1351-52 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2006)).
68
Id. at 1354.
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69

substantive rulemaking power,” stating that such a principle was
70
“amply supported by our precedent.”
To determine whether the Final Rules were substantive or proce71
dural, the Federal Circuit chose to follow JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.
In JEM, the D.C. Circuit found new rules to be procedural because
they did not “foreclose effective opportunity to make one’s case on
72
the merits.”
Under the JEM framework, the Federal Circuit concluded, the PTO’s Final Rules did not “‘foreclose effective opportunity’ to present patent applications for examination”—they only re73
quired applicants to exert more efforts to comply. Although it found
the Final Rules in Tafas to be procedural, the Federal Circuit left the
door open for future challenges to PTO-proposed rules, stating that
“an agency’s determination of the scope of its own authority is not en74
titled to Chevron deference.”
The PTO spun the outcome in Tafas as a victory, stating that it was
“pleased that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confirmed that the Final Rules are within the agency’s rulemaking authority and that the rules regarding requests for continued examination, claims, and examination support documents are consistent
75
with the law.”
Tafas represents an expansion in power for the PTO in some ways,
but the result is not as favorable as the PTO wanted. Most obviously,
one of the four rules proposed by the PTO was struck down by the
Federal Circuit, even though it was procedural, because it “attempt[ed] to add an additional requirement [for filing third and subsequent continuation applications]—that the application not contain
amendments, arguments, or evidence that could have been submitted
76
earlier—that is foreclosed by the statute.” Despite being urged by
the PTO and several amici to give the PTO deference on its interpretation of the statute, the Federal Circuit declined to do so. More sub-

69

Id. at 1352 (quoting Tafas, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 811).
Id.
71
22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
72
Id. at 327-28 (quoting Lamoille Valley R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm’n, 711 F.2d 295, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
73
Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1356 (quoting JEM, 22 F.3d at 328).
74
Id. at 1353.
75
See Paul Devinsky & Nathaniel McQueen, Tafas v. Doll: Patent Rules Given New
Life by Federal Circuit, MONDAQ, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
articleid=76908 (quoting a PTO press release).
76
Tafas, 559 F.3d at 1360.
70
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tly, the framework used by the Federal Circuit to determine whether
future PTO-proposed rules are procedural or substantive continues to
allow the court to oversee the PTO. By announcing that the PTO did
not have the ability to determine the scope of its own authority—a
view about which the Federal Circuit admitted that “the majority of
the Supreme Court has not yet spoken”—the court left the door open
77
for future refusals to grant deference to PTO rulemaking. In the
long run, the significance of the PTO’s gains under Tafas, like those
under Zurko, may be more symbolic than substantive.
Some commentators have advocated in favor of expanding the
scope of PTO rulemaking authority, proposing that the Federal Circuit ought to review the PTO’s interpretations of the Patent Act using
the framework set forth in Chevron for questions of law and mixed
78
questions of law and fact. Under a broad reading of Chevron, the
PTO would assume the primary responsibility for interpreting the
Patent Act when the statutory term at issue is ambiguous or the Act is
silent regarding its meaning—an interpretive role traditionally re79
served for the Federal Circuit as an Article III court. This would, at
least in theory, constitute a shift in power from the Federal Circuit to
the PTO. Whether this would actually constitute a shift in power is a
80
different matter.
Many of the most important provisions of the Patent Act are
fraught with textual ambiguity. Words such as “nonobvious,” “used,”
“process”—and for the epistemologically minded, “known”—appear

77

Id. at 1353.
See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
1415, 1423 (1995) (arguing for heightened deference on the part of the Federal Circuit to the PTO to produce an “optimal balance of interpretive power”); Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’ Y 199, 221-26 (2000) (promoting application of the Chevron standard to the “central patentability question of nonobviousness”).
79
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984) (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”).
80
Some commentators think that Chevron’s impact is not all it has been cracked
up to be. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan,
96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (”[W]e conclude there has not been a Chevron ‘revolution’ at the Supreme Court level.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 990 (1992) (arguing that the impact of Chevron has been
overstated and that “post-Chevron decisions explicating the meaning of Chevron reveal
much that calls into question the Court’s fidelity to the doctrine”).
78
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81

throughout the Patent Act. Congress quite notably spoke directly to
82
few questions of patent law when it wrote the Patent Act in 1952. In
the absence of such direction, Chevron would give the PTO potentially
83
broad power to interpret the Patent Act. For example, the PTO
could raise or lower the threshold at which an invention is declared
obvious by altering its definition of the word “obvious” or by redefining the word “process” to declare subject matter off limits.
Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit has resisted this notion, not
just in Tafas but elsewhere, commenting that the PTO “does not earn
84
Chevron deference on questions of substantive patent law.” As the
court has explained, “the broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers . . . authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does
NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules,”
and since “Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power . . . . the rule of controlling defer85
ence set forth in Chevron does not apply.” Such resistance on the
part of the Federal Circuit to applying Chevron to PTO patent decisions does not apply to other administrative bodies—including the
86
trademark side of the PTO—that come before the court. As Craig
Nard notes, Federal Circuit panel majorities have not just cited Chevron but have applied it to many other adjudicative bodies, including
the International Trade Commission, the Merit Systems Protection
Board, the Court of Federal Claims, the Board of Contract Appeals,
the Court of Veterans Appeals, and the International Trade Admini87
stration.

81

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country . . . .”); id. § 103(b)(1)
(providing the circumstances under which “a biotechnological process . . . shall be
considered nonobvious”).
82
Giles S. Rich and Pat Federico were the actual drafters of the Patent Act. See
Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came To Be, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 181, 181-82 (2004).
83
See 467 U.S. at 843 (asserting that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute”).
84
Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
85
Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Animal
Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
86
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994
F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying the Chevron test to the PTO’s construction of the Lanham Act).
87
Nard, supra note 78, at 1432-33.
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B. Funding
The PTO has not just been active in the legal arena in its attempts
to expand its influence. It has also been working hard on the financial and public relations fronts to gain more control over, and expand, its budget. We should not be surprised that the PTO would be
trying to expand its budget: funding is important to the life and in88
fluence of any agency. We don’t often think of regulatory institutions as appealing to their constituencies—indeed, agency entanglement with the community it is supposed to regulate is usually
portrayed in the literature as being more of a demand-side initiative—
but inviting capture is precisely what the PTO did in the 1990s, taking
89
its appeals directly to the regulated community.
After a series of legislative provisions throughout the 1990s allowed Congress to use the PTO as a revenue generator, one of the
top-priority items for the PTO became gaining more control over its
budget. In 1990, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia90
tion Act (OBRA), which, among other things, required the PTO to
91
fund its operations through fees that it collected from its users. In
92
addition, from fiscal year (FY) 1991 to FY 1999, OBRA imposed a
sixty-nine percent surcharge on top of both patent application and is93
suance fees. Fees collected from users were “available [to the PTO]
94
until expended,” whereas surcharge revenue was not. As a result, the

88

See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOV81 (1971) (hypothesizing that agencies attempt to maximize the size of their
budgets).
89
Let me reiterate that the PTO is not truly a regulatory institution in the sense
that the EPA, for example, is a regulatory institution. See Kerr, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
90
Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
91
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-382, at 7-8 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1320, 1322-23 (noting the drastic fee increase imposed by OBRA); H.R. REP. NO. 101881, at 159 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2167 (“The purpose of this title
is to make the Patent and Trademark Office self-sufficient by imposing a surcharge on
user fees . . . .”). An exception is PTO employee benefits, which are administered by
the Office of Personnel Management. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-881, at 162 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2170 (noting that fees will be credited to PTO salaries and expense accounts).
92
The federal government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30. Fiscal
year 2001, for example, covers the period from October 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001.
93
§ 10101(a), 104 Stat. at 1388-391 (codified at 35 U.S.C. 41 note (2006)).
94
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 69.
Starting in FY 1992, Congress withheld surcharge revenue from PTO appropriations
and used that revenue for other programs.
ERNMENT
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PTO became entirely self-funded, with Congress taking its cut of the
money that the PTO raised.
In 1993, the year Bruce Lehman became Commissioner of the
PTO, the Office began sending glossy informational brochures about
itself to patent prosecutors, law firms, and firms in the technological
95
community. The first such publication was given the rather dull title
of “Annual Report,” but the brochures quickly became more overtly
promotional. Starting the following year, the brochures began refer96
ring to inventors as “customers.” They stated that the PTO’s mission
97
was to “help our customers get patents” and to “ensure strong intel98
lectual property protection for all Americans.” The PTO announced
that it could serve its “customers” better if only it had a bigger budget,
more office space, more control over its internal operations, executive
99
branch agency status, and other items it identified on its wish list. At
the same time, the PTO declared that one of its goals was to come to
100
“play a leadership role in intellectual property rights policy” and to
101
achieve “greater partnering with industry.”
The Washington, D.C. policy community took notice quickly.
Previously, the PTO had been an unfashionable backwater, a bureau
of the Department of Commerce that was perpetually underfunded,
95

See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE AND
COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS: ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1993
[hereinafter 1993 REPORT].
96
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 1994 passim [hereinafter 1994 REPORT].
97
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW:
CREATING A PATENT AND TRADEMARK SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, FISCAL YEAR
1997, at 8 [hereinafter 1997 REPORT].
98
1994 REPORT, supra note 96, at 1. One wonders about non-U.S. residents, who
at that time filed almost half of all patent applications. See id. at 63 tbl.2, 67 tbl.11
(showing that non-U.S. residents filed 83,920 out of 201,554 patent applications, or
41.6%, in 1994); see also 1997 REPORT, supra note 97, at 85, 89 (showing that non-U.S.
residents filed 102,249 out of 237,045 patent applications, or 43.1%, in 1997).
99
See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SETTING THE COURSE FOR OUR FUTURE: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 1995, at 36 [hereinafter
1995 REPORT] (listing “long-term space needs, restrictions in the number of PTO employees, and continued diversion of funds by Congress” as “critical areas for financial
and management improvement”).
100
1997 REPORT, supra note 97, at 6; 1995 REPORT, supra note 99, at 5, 11-12; see
also 1994 REPORT, supra note 96, at 1 (“[T]he PTO seeks to play a leadership role in . . .
develop[ing] . . . strong intellectual property protection.”).
101
See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, IDEAS THAT BECOME VALUABLE INNOVATIONS: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW, FISCAL YEAR 1998, http://
www.uspto.gov/go/com/annual/1998/a98r-toc.htm/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (follow “Patents” or follow “Innovators and Innovations”).
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understaffed, and overlooked. That began to change. As early as
1994, The National Law Journal named Lehman “Lawyer of the Year,”
stating that he “has brought his job—and U.S. intellectual property
102
policy—to an unprecedented level of importance.”
The PTO’s financial position steadily improved as various interest
groups began to take up the cause of the PTO. Figure 1 shows the
amounts of PTO funding, along with PTO’s workload, from 1976 onward. As can be seen from the figure, the increase in the PTO’s annual budget allocation has steadily outstripped the increase in the
number of patents filed and has greatly outstripped the increase in
103
the number of patents issued. Part of this is due to the PTO’s internal operations becoming more computerized and technologically
driven. Even taking this into account, the increase in the budget has
been notable.
Funding issues have continued to be a hot-button topic. The PTO
has tried to use soft rhetoric in its communications with the inventive
community. Rather than call the money it charged patent applicants
“fees,” the PTO came to refer to them as “Revenues from Sales of
104
105
Goods and Services to the Public,” and, later, “Earned Revenue.”
When the OBRA provisions sunsetted in FY 1999, Congress began limiting the amount of patent fees that the PTO was authorized to spend
106
each year, a practice referred to by the patent community as “fee diversion.” In addition, that same year Congress approved “rescissions”
of the PTO’s authority to spend some of the patent fees it charged, instead skimming off the revenues and using them to fund other items
107
Over the next several years, the inventive
in the federal budget.

102

Lawyer of the Year: Bruce Lehman: Reinventing the Patent Office, NAT’L L.J., Dec.
26, 1994 , at C10.
103
Note that this funding is for the PTO as a whole, including the Trademark Office.
104
See, e.g., 1995 REPORT, supra note 99, at 50.
105
See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 50.
106
See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office Reauthorization Act, Fiscal
Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-358, sec. 3(b), 112 Stat. 3272, 3273-74 (1998) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2006)).
107
The rescinded money was used for such purposes as deficit reduction, see Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998), subsidies to the steel, coal, and oil industries, see
Emergency Oil and Gas Guaranteed Loan Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106-51, § 202(a),
113 Stat. 252, 258, appropriations for homeland security programs, see 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-206, § 1403(a), 116 Stat. 820, 898, and a
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community came to support the PTO as it advocated hard to end fee
108
diversion. The combination of the PTO and the inventive community lobbying has succeeded in convincing Congress each year since
2005 to refrain from diverting fees for that year.
Notable gains to the PTO came not just in the form of an increasing budget, but also in its internal organization and ability to control
its finances. In 2000, the PTO became an executive branch agency
and the position of head of the PTO was elevated from mere commissioner to “Under Secretary of the Department of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trade109
In 2004, the PTO moved into the new campus built
mark Office.”
for it in Alexandria, Virginia, almost doubling the amount of space al110
located to it relative to its previous location. In the 2009 fiscal year,
111
the Senate funded the PTO at $2.075 billion. For the fourth year in
112
a row, the PTO was allowed to keep the money it charged users. In
short, there is nothing on the PTO’s wish list from the mid-1990s that
it has not received a decade later.
Much of the credit for these benefits can be laid directly at the
feet of various interest groups that have lobbied on behalf of increasing the PTO’s budget and ending fee diversion: the American Bar Association, the American Intellectual Property Law Association, Amgen, the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), the Intellectual
Property Owners Association (IPO), Microsoft Corporation, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the National Research
Council, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to name a few.

variety of federal programs, e.g., District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, app. E § 301(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-303 (1999).
108
See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Bar Ass’n, PTO Fee Diversion Costs Jobs: Bar, Industry United Against Diversion (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
intelprop/feediversion.pdf (“All of the major bar association groups in the IP arena,
and the clients they represent, stand united: PTO fee diversion must come to an end.”).
109
See AIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-113, sec. 4713, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 1501A-575 (1999)
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 3).
110
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 12 [hereinafter 2004 REPORT].
111
See WILLIAM J. KROUSE & EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RES. SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE AND RELATED AGENCIES: F Y 2009
APPROPRIATIONS 21 (2008), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/
08Aug/RL34540.pdf.
112
See Hatch Draws Attention to PTO Diversion with Amendment, CONGRESSDAILY, Mar.
17, 2008, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/dj_20080317_9.php.
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Having proven itself eager “to address issues raised by intellectual
113
property stakeholders,” the PTO has basked in the appreciation of
the inventive community. The PTO has noted that “[o]ur patent customers told us: ‘I am pleased with the customer approach to processing patent applications as opposed to the previous, sometimes adversarial approach.’ [And] ‘[e]xaminers seem flexible and interested in
working with applicants to allow patentable subject matter to
114
The PTO has declared new subject matter benefiting secgrant.’”
tors that supported it to be patent-eligible (thereby also increasing the
fees it can gather) and established and further solidified internal procedures that make granting patents, rather than denying them, the
115
default rule.
The PTO has become bolder and bolder over the past decade, to
the point where it is getting more aggressive and litigious in attempting to get what it wants. I predict that the PTO will continue to attempt to increase its market share as a supplier of legal rules. This
does not necessarily mean that the PTO will always attempt to
strengthen patent protection or broaden the scope of patent-eligible
subject matter, however. As the PTO itself has recognized, it can get
support from the inventive community, or at least deflect some criticism, by making the process of getting patents more rigorous. Some
commentators have said of the changes to the PTO’s budgetary rules
and of the PTO’s attempts to become financially self-sufficient: “It is
now apparent that these seemingly mundane procedural changes,
taken together, have resulted in the most profound changes in U.S.
116
patent policy and practice since 1836.”
III. THE UPSHOT
While we often think of agency entanglement with the constituency it is supposed to regulate as an unalloyed bad, there are some
113

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2006 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET RE21 (describing the 21st Century Strategic Plan as “a multi-year plan that identifies
critical tasks designed to provide the USPTO and external stakeholders with a longterm vision of agency goals, potential funding levels, and planned outcomes”).
114
Q. Todd Dickinson, Commissioner’s Page, PTO TODAY (USPTO), Jan. 2000, at 2,
5, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/ptotoday/ptotoday01.pdf.
115
See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 324-25 (noting that the method of calculating disposal of applications and the requirement to indicate reasons for rejections encourage examiners to allow patents to issue).
116
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 12, at 2.
QUEST
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benefits that have come out of the PTO’s attempts to increase its influence. The PTO’s attempts to appeal to the inventive community
have resulted in more resources being funneled to the PTO, more airtime being given to some of the problems that plague the PTO, and
more rigorous debate about the faults and flaws of the patent system.
At the same time, there are dangers to the PTO’s expanded power. In
this Part, I discuss a few of the benefits and concerns surrounding an
expanded sphere of influence for the PTO.
A. Transparency
Accusations that the PTO is behaving self-interestedly are nothing
new. Within a few years of the PTO’s creation by the Jackson admini117
stration in 1836, U.S. Congressman Thomas W. Gilmer accused the
then-Patent Office, among other entities, of obstructing Congress’s attempts to determine how the Patent Office might reduce its own ex118
What is new is the PTO’s appeal to the inventive compenditures.
119
munity in its quest to expand its role in the market for influence.
We can think of the PTO’s annual reports as an attempt to improve rapport with the inventive community. One of the explicit
functions of the reports is to demonstrate that the PTO sees itself as
sympathetic to the concerns of the inventive community. As the PTO
itself has said of one of the communications it sent to the patent
community: “The 21st Century Strategic Plan is a five-year plan that
identifies critical tasks designed to provide the USPTO and external
stakeholders with a long-term vision of agency goals, potential funding
120
It also described the same doculevels, and planned outcomes.”
ment as having been created “in order to address issues raised by in121
tellectual property stakeholders.” One of the advantages of the publication of such information is that it functions as a form of
informative, and not entirely cheap, speech. The reports transmit in-

117

See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (establishing the Patent Office, the
predecessor of the PTO).
118
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from
Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1669 (2008) (stating that “Congress
was, as always, suspicious that administrators were wasting government money”).
119
One of the first discussions of agency capture can be found in MARVER H.
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 3-4, 90, 284 (1955).
Bernstein argued that in the later part of an agency’s life cycle, the agency often becomes closely entangled with the industry it is supposed to regulate.
120
2004 REPORT, supra note 110, at 51.
121
Id.
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formation about the PTO’s positions on a variety of important patent
policy, legal, and financial matters. Much of the information conveyed in the reports is subject to external verification. The PTO has
become much more forthcoming about information pertaining to its
internal operations. As a result, although the PTO started out as an
experience good, over time it has become more like a search good, at
122
least with respect to its policies. If the information that the PTO reveals is costly speech that is accurate, verifiable, and provides greater
institutional transparency, this creates a social benefit. This is the optimistic view.
The less optimistic view is that the PTO could behave strategically
in the way it presents information to the inventive community, thus
reducing institutional transparency. While it is unlikely that the PTO
would use its communications with the inventive community to make
outright misstatements of fact, the PTO could use its annual reports to
draw attention away from policy problems by focusing the discussion
on issues that redound to its benefit or appear benign. The PTO has
already proven itself quite adept at using euphemistic language, such
as calling user fees “Revenues from Sales of Goods and Services to the
123
Public.” And although the PTO has modified its rhetoric somewhat
in recent years, even in 2008 it was still referring to inventors as “cus124
tomers,” talking about the “tremendous ingenuity of American in125
ventors,” and stating that it desired to “promote still greater collabo126
ration between the USPTO and its customers.” Clearly, the PTO is
concerned about being in the good graces of the inventive community, and such a desire creates incentives for the PTO to behave strategically.
While much of the information that the PTO reveals in its annual
reports is verifiable, what is less verifiable is the nature of the information that the PTO leaves out of the reports. For instance, the “count
system”—the metric used to measure patent examiners’ productivity—
has long been the bane of the PTO’s internal operating procedure
and a source of bias in the way that the PTO reviews patent applications. The PTO’s annual reports give the count system short shrift.
122

See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312
(1970) (defining experience goods, search goods, and inspection goods).
123
See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
124
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 passim [hereinafter 2008 REPORT].
125
Id. at 34.
126
Id. at 7.
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Indeed, the PTO has been quite secretive about this weakness for
many years, an omission that was only partially redressed in a report
127
by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Inspector General.
Internal PTO practices create a bias in favor of granting patents. Patent examiners have quarterly performance quotas that they need to
meet, each of which gives each examiner a short period of time to re128
How much time examiners have to
view each patent application.
review the technology varies according to the “technology center,” or
technological subdivision, within the PTO, but estimates vary from
129
At different points in the prosecution
eight to twenty-five hours.
process, examiners have incentives to reject or grant patents in order
to meet their performance quotas. Because one of the metrics by
which examiners are evaluated is the final disposition of patent applications, examiners have the incentive to grant a patent after two office
130
actions (rounds of communication with the patent applicant). As a
result, the count system is an important part of PTO operating procedures. Because it affects the speed and order in which examiners
prosecute applications, the intricacies of the count system are a matter
of interest to the inventive community.
The PTO might also attempt to manipulate the inventive community with the information that it releases, or frame its communications
in a way that makes the PTO’s positions seem more aligned with the
interests of the inventive community than they really are. For instance, while recent reports have been admirably candid about some
of the quality-control problems facing the PTO, they have shaded the
nature of the position that the PTO took before Congress regarding
the scope of its rulemaking authority. Whereas the PTO told Congress that “rulemaking authority is beneficial to the patent system,”
that it “welcomes authority that is necessary to promulgate regulations
to ensure an efficient and quality-based patent examination process,”

127

See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, USPTO SHOULD
REASSESS HOW EXAMINER GOALS, PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLANS, AND THE AWARD
SYSTEM STIMULATE AND REWARD EXAMINER PRODUCTION 7-8 (2004) (noting that individual examiner productivity is measured by the number of first office actions and disposals).
128
See, e.g., id. at 8 (detailing examiners’ two-week production goals).
129
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 5, at 5 (2003) (providing estimates
from panelists of the range of time for patent examinations).
130
See Thomas, supra note 115, at 324-25 (explaining how the docket management
system has led many to believe that examiners are encouraged to allow patent applications to issue).

1992

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 1965

and that it “thank[s] Congress for suggesting appropriate authority
131
for the USPTO,” the following year the PTO downplayed its position
when communicating with the inventive community, saying that it
merely sought “specific authority to eliminate, set, or otherwise adjust
patent and trademark filing and processing fees subject to appropriate
oversight and comment by the Patent Public Advisory Committee, the
Trademark Public Advisory Committee, stakeholders, and Con132
There is a reason that the PTO has remained quiet about
gress.”
this goal before the audience of the inventive community: expanding
the PTO’s rulemaking capacity is a divisive issue within the inventive
133
Unlike requests
community, with vocal opinion running against it.
that the PTO has made in the past for the inventive community to
support it in matters like executive branch agency status or an end to
fee diversion, the PTO is unlikely to bring the inventive community around
to its point of view on the matter of legal deference any time soon.
B. Capture and Institutional Bias
The PTO’s attempts to woo the inventive community present the
obvious danger of the PTO being captured by the very group that it is
supposed to regulate. The PTO’s legal and budgetary gains, coupled
with its desire to stay in the inventive community’s good graces, make
it an attractive target for capture. From the perspective of patent applicants, even a small amount of influence over the process by which
patents are granted could be quite valuable.
While in theory the likelihood of PTO capture may be high, as
one would expect from an agency funded entirely by the constituency
that it regulates, in reality the probability of capture is lower than it
would at first appear. Several factors reduce the possibility of capture.
First, the major interest groups with something at stake in patent
law—the pharmaceutical industry and the software industry—have
131

Sullivan Letter, supra note 57, at 9.
2008 REPORT, supra note 124, at 34.
133
Amicus briefs in Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), ran thirteen-totwo against the PTO. The amicus briefs in support of Tafas were filed by the American
Intellectual Property Law Association; the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO);
Cantor Fitzgerald Patent Holdings (CFPH); Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.; Intellectual
Ventures, et al.; the Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO); Robert Lelkes;
Licensing Professionals; Monsanto; the New York Intellectual Property Law Association
(NYIPLA); the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA);
SonicWALL et al.; and the William Mitchell College of Law Intellectual Property Institute. The two briefs in support of the PTO were filed by Intellectual Property and
Administrative Law Professors and by the Public Patent Foundation et al.
132
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generally proven to be well-organized and balanced on opposite sides
134
of many key issues in patent law and policy. This makes capture of
the PTO by one industry or interest group less likely. Second, the inventive community has not been particularly interested in capturing
the agency.
Interest groups have generally been more supportive of the PTO
before Congress on financial matters than on legal matters. Perhaps
this is because the PTO has appealed to the inventive community
much more often, and more passionately, for support on issues regarding financial resources and physical plant needs. Only rarely,
such as when it wanted to be elevated to executive agency status, has
the PTO taken its case to the inventive community on legal matters.
But the types of issues on which the inventive community chooses to
support the PTO are likely determined more by the inventive community itself than by the PTO. Perhaps the inventive community prefers to support the PTO on financial matters because it distrusts the
PTO’s judgment on legal issues and sees its support on financial matters as a way of keeping the PTO on a short leash. The types of issues
on which the inventive community has consistently supported the
PTO tend to be ephemeral, requiring the PTO to go back to Congress
periodically, rather than ones that would give the PTO permanent
benefits. If the inventive community refrains from supporting expansions of PTO power because it distrusts the PTO’s judgment, and if
the support of the inventive community is necessary for the PTO to
get what it wants from Congress, then the inventive community is acting as a check on PTO power. But if the inventive community refrains
from supporting the PTO on issues that would expand the PTO’s
power permanently in order to keep the PTO beholden to it, that increases the danger of capture.
The social costs of PTO capture, if it occurred, would likely be
smaller than they appear at first blush. The PTO’s reach is limited, as
it doesn’t have regulatory authority over the inventive community in
the same way that the Food and Drug Administration can regulate
pharmaceutical products or the Environmental Protection Agency can
135
regulate pollution-emission activities.
The PTO does not regulate
the ongoing use of inventions after a patent is granted. This lessens
concerns about the degree to which industry influence over the PTO

134

See Clarisa Long, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law (Nov.
2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
135
See Kerr, supra note 5 (arguing that the PTO is not a regulatory agency).
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136

would create social harms. Nevertheless, the power to grant patents
is an important one, and distortions caused by interest-group influence over the process of examining patents can still cause social harm.
Allowing a patent to issue when it should not (a Type I error), as well
as denying a patent on an invention that meets all the legal requirements for a patent (a Type II error), can have long-term effects on innovation and the development of technology, especially in infant industries.
Issues of capture aside, there are other concerns about the PTO
gaining a larger share of the market for legal influence in patent law.
One concern is the potential for PTO bias against certain parties or
inventions. The PTO has not attempted to appeal to all applicants
equally in its annual reports. Instead, it has focused on inventors who
are U.S. citizens, promising to “ensure strong intellectual property
137
protection for all Americans” and reporting that it has “worked to
138
foster innovation among America’s next generation.”
Describing
itself as “The World’s Best Patent Office,” the PTO has announced
that it “educates others about intellectual property protection,” in139
Residents of foreign countries filed
cluding foreign governments.
47.1% of all patent applications in 2007, but perhaps unsurprisingly,
140
this is a constituency that the PTO has not attempted to woo.
In addition to bias in favor of some applicants, the PTO has an incentive to favor patentees over nonpatentees, although both groups
have an interest in making sure that the patent system functions well.
This is not surprising; nonpatentees are not a constituency of the
PTO. At the level of substantive patent policy, the PTO’s budgetary
structure creates a bias in favor of granting patents and encouraging
inventors to apply for patents. It also creates the incentive for the
PTO to favor patentees (who pay fees to the PTO) over nonpatentees
(who do not). The size of the PTO’s budget is a function of the filing
and maintenance fees that the PTO receives. By reminding its “customers” that it wants to help them get patents, the PTO encourages
136

See G. Dosi et al., How Much Should Society Fuel the Greed of Innovators? On the Relations Between Appropriability, Opportunities and Rates of Innovation, 35 RES. POL’ Y 1110,
1115 (2006) (discussing regulatory capture in heavily regulated industries where innovation is strongly tied to intellectual property rights); see also Michele Boldrin & David
K. Levine, The Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
1252, 1255 (2005) (discussing the effect of “monopoly creep” on regulatory agencies).
137
1994 REPORT, supra note 96, at 1.
138
2007 REPORT, supra note 22, at 3.
139
2005 REPORT, supra note 22, at 3-4.
140
See 2008 REPORT, supra note 124, at 116 tbl.2, 122 tbl.9 (showing that, in 2007,
residents of foreign countries filed 220,432 out of 468,330 applications).
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inventors to submit more applications, which results in more revenue
from filing fees. Granting more patents yields more maintenance
fees. This is yet one more factor undercutting the traditional adversarial relationship that the PTO is supposed to have with patent applicants.
For its part, the PTO stands to benefit from continuing to seek
control over more resources. A strategy of appealing to the inventive
community for support does not require the PTO to share the resulting legal or financial gains with other institutions. The probability of
free-riding by other institutions will be low, since the PTO’s gains—
whether budgetary or legal—are specific to the PTO. Nor does the
PTO face the problem of geographical dispersion, which would raise
141
With Congress out of
the costs of coordination and organization.
the picture, the PTO faces no oppositional institution in the area of
patent prosecution other than the Federal Circuit. A fairly robust
(and completely intuitive) finding in the empirical literature is that
interest groups fare better if they face no countervailing forces in the
142
With these incentives, we can expect the PTO to
political arena.
continue to attempt to gain more influence and resources in the market for patent policy and to appeal to the inventive community for
support.
CONCLUSION
The PTO’s attempts to increase its influence have been waged on
two fronts: First, the gains that it has made in the legal arena may not
have had a large substantive effect, but they have had significant symbolic value. Second, the gains that the PTO has made by appealing
directly to the inventive community have been more powerful. When
the inventive community has taken the PTO’s side before Congress,
the results have been impressive. While appeals by an agency to its
constituency for support are unusual and present obvious dangers of

141

See J. Snyder, Political Geography and Interest-Group Power, 6 SOC. CHOICE & WEL103, 105 (1989) (suggesting that geography can raise the costs of organizing but
can also bring more resources under an entity’s control).
142
See, e.g., Michel Boucher, Rent-Seeking and the Behavior of Regulators: An Empirical
Analysis, 69 PUB. CHOICE 51, 65 (1991) (explaining that large trucking firms were more
successful in Quebec because of their political effectiveness and better relationship
with political regulators); Paul Teske, Interests and Institutions in State Regulation, 35
AMER. J. POL. SCI. 139, 151 (1991) (finding that the existence of a state-funded consumer advocacy group reduces the political effectiveness of telecommunication companies’ lobbying efforts).
FARE
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capture and opportunities for bargaining on the part of the regulated
community, in the case of the PTO there have been positive benefits.
The PTO has become more transparent as part of the tacit bargain
that it is attempting to strike with the inventive community. At the
same time, however, the PTO has the incentive to be strategic with the
information that it reveals so as to present its case in the best light.
For its part, the inventive community may function as a check on the
PTO, or it may end up enabling the PTO to gain a larger share of the
market for influence in patent law. How this ongoing relationship will
continue to develop remains to be seen.
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A detailed breakdown of these data appears in Table 1.
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Table 1: United States Patent and Trademark Office
Funding Levels, 1976–2009
Year
(Director)

PTO Budget
(millions)144

Surcharge
(millions)145

Patent
Applications
Filed146

Patents
Granted

Backlog147

1976

$25

0

109,227

80,735

142,379

1977

$25

0

109,773

72,832

144,542

1978

$25

0

108,744

70,320

144,056

1979

$25

0

107,409

55,418

151,702

1980

$25

0

112,215

61,227

167,533

1981

$25

0

114,710

71,010

181,727

1982

$25

0

124,800

65,152

216,509

1983

$162.42148

0

105,704

59,715

223,101

1984

$193.47

0

117,985

72,149

219,567

1985

$209.69

0

125,931

75,302

215,512

1986

$227.89

0

131,403

76,993

207,774

1987

$260.95

0

137,173

88,793

209,911

1988

$305.02

0

148,183

83,584

215,280

1989

$335.77

0

163,306

102,712

222,755

1990

$344.70

0

174,711

96,727

244,964

1991

$370.63

$99.3

178,083

101,860

254,507
269,596

1992

$435.91

$95

185,446

109,728

1993 (Lehman)

$502.37

$99

188,099

107,332

244,646

1994 (Lehman)

$529.02149

$103

201,554

113,268

261,249

1995 (Lehman)

$581.17

$107

236,679

114,241

298,522

1996 (Lehman)

$592.50150

$111

206,276

116,875

303,720

144

The PTO approximated its budget for 1976 to 1982 inclusive using its 1993
Annual Report. See 1993 REPORT, supra note 95, at 37 fig.12.
145
See Public Budget Database Fiscal Year 2009, Budget Authority Table, Row 594,
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/sheets/budauth.xls (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
146
For data on patent applications filed, patents granted, and backlog, see the Annual Reports of the PTO for each year from 1993 to 2008. USPTO Annual Reports,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
147
The PTO calls its backlog “Patent Applications Pending Prior to Allowance.”
They include utility, design, plant, and reissue applications.
148
For PTO budget data for years 1983 to 1993 inclusive, see 1993 REPORT, supra
note 95, at 49 tbl.2. For budget years 1983 to 1990 inclusive, the PTO’s total funding
for a given year came from five sources: Appropriations from the General Fund, Offsetting Fee Collections, Unobligated Balances from the Prior Year, Federal Reimbursements, and Recovery of Prior Year Obligations.
149
For PTO budget data for years 1994 to 1995 inclusive, see 1995 REPORT, supra
note 99, at 50.
150
For PTO budget data for years 1996 to 1997 inclusive, see 1997 REPORT, supra
note 97, at 50.
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Year
(Director)
1997 (Lehman)

PTO Budget
(millions)

Surcharge
(millions)

Patent
Applications
Filed

Patents
Granted

1999

Backlog

$702.43

$115

237,045

122,977

373,904

1998 (Dickinson)

$691.00151

$119

256,666

154,579

379,484

1999 (Dickinson)

$643.03152

0

278,268

159,166

414,837

2000 (Dickinson)

$755.00153

0

311,807

182,223

485,129

2001 (Godici)

$783.84154

0

344,717

187,822

542,007

2002 (Rogan)

$843.70155

0

353,394

177,317

636,530

2003 (Rogan)

$1,015.23156

0

355,418

189,590

674,691

2004 (Dudas)

$1,235.70157

0

378,984

187,170

756,604

2005 (Dudas)

$1,514.10

0

409,532

165,483

885,002

2006 (Dudas)

$1,680.10

0

445,613

183,187

1,036,588

2007 (Dudas)

$1,794.50

0

468,330

184,377

1,112,517

2008 (Dudas)

$1,916.00158

0

495,095

182,556

1,276,028

2009

$2,075.00159

–

–

–

–
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See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2475 (1997).
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 caused the PTO to become essentially fully user-fee funded by 1991. See Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-391 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 41 note(2006)). By 1993, the PTO did not receive
any appropriations from the general revenue. During this period, Congress instituted
a fee surcharge, of which it only appropriated a portion to the PTO.
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See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-82 (1998). In 1999, Congress passed
the American Inventors Protection Act and began a policy of diverting patent fees. See
discussion supra note 6. Congress accepted all of the PTO’s collected fees into the general fund, but only returned part of that amount to the PTO in its appropriations bills.
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See Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-23, 1501A-28 (1999).
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See Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762A-69, 2762-A73 to -A74 (2000).
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See Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 769, 773 (2001). In 2002, Congress passed the Intellectual Property and High Technology Technical Amendments Act of 2002, which among
other things “authorized to be appropriated to the [PTO between 2003 and 2008] an
amount equal to the fees estimated . . . to be collected in each such fiscal year, respectively.” See Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13102, 116 Stat. 1899, 1899 (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 42 note).
156
See Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 72 (2003).
157
For PTO budget data for years 2004 to 2007 inclusive, see 2007 REPORT, supra
note 22, at 51 fig.
158
2008 REPORT, supra note 124, at 54 fig.
159
See KROUSE & MURPHY, supra note 111, at 21.

